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 RURAL/URBAN RESIDENCE LOCATION CHOICE 
 
 Motivation 
People concerned about rural development need to know which effect is stronger: do "jobs follow 
people" or do "people follow jobs?" (Muth, Carlino and Mills; Knapp and Graves).  This dichotomy has 
frequently been the basis of the analysis of metropolitan population and employment growth.  And, the 
evidence supports each hypothesis under alternative circumstances.  Employment is always important.  
But since urban locations all offer higher probabilities of employment than rural locations, rural 
development economists really need to know what else determines the choice of a rural residence.   
The rural economic development programs of "smokestack chasing," federal funds acquisition, and 
export promotion (Isserman 1994) all operate on the assumption that people-follow-jobs.  On the other 
hand, strategies based on attracting entrepreneurs, tourists, or retirees, rely on the jobs-follow-people 
assumption.  Different strategies are appropriate for different regions, depending on the characteristics of 
the desired population and the characteristics of the region.  In this paper we report how rural versus 
urban residential locations are chosen as determined by personal and local characteristics.  In doing so we 
shed some light on two questions: (1) What types of people choose to live in rural areas as opposed to 
urban ones; and (2) What types of local characteristics increase the probability that people choose to 
reside in a rural area rather than an urban one?   
While there are a number of studies of intermetropolitan migration and intrametropolitan location 
choice, there are only a few that consider rural locations at all (Beladi and Ingene; Clark and Hunter; 
Plane).  Clark and Hunter estimate population-weighted net migration as functions of labor market 
characteristics, amenities, location indicators, and fiscal policies using a sample of both metro and 
nonmetro counties.  The estimated coefficient on the dummy variable for proximity to the central city 
indicates only that rural locations are not preferred by any age group.  Plane describes how the changing 
age distribution affects the regional population distribution.  As the baby-boomers retire, we should 
expect a reallocation of retiree population as well as working-age population, due to service-sector 
interdependencies. 
  We attempt to identify the things local governments can do to attract the economically active 
population to reside in nonmetropolitan areas.  We find that there are some public expenditures, such as 
on infrastructure and highways, which successfully attract population to rural areas.  Other types of 
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government spending work in the opposite direction.  And the net locational effects of government 
spending by program type depend on adjacency or nonadjacency and local population densities.  Not all 
strategies can be used equally well by all nonmetro communities. 
We use the same basic approach as those who have studied intrametropolitan migration using 
multinomial logit statistical analyses (Fox, Herzog, and Schlottman; McFadden 1978; Greene).  This is a 
discrete choice problem: people choose to live in one type of area as opposed to another for some reason. 
 What are the most likely reasons?  We assume that this choice is a constrained optimum: people may 
choose their residence, but they take into account their own abilities and opportunities to make a living, 
and there are often family considerations, other personal reasons, and local economic conditions 
determining why their potential residential locations are limited.  Furthermore, we are interested in 
focusing on rural as distinct from urban locations, so we adopt a typology to group all possible locations 
into a few alternative categories. 
We provide a theoretical overview of residential location choice that accommodates most hypotheses 
and provides a model that can be estimated.  Then we review the multinomial logit econometric modeling 
technique, discuss data problems and normalization issues, and explain our approach to typology.  We 
show the results of the statistical analyses and interpret them.   
 
 Theoretical Framework: Residential Location Choice 
The literature provides a wide range of relevant hypotheses about residence location choice.  In the 
extreme, these may be summarized into five models: residence location depends on (1) workplace 
location, (2) local amenities or "quality of life," (3) life-cycle and other personal characteristics, (4) return 
to human capital accumulation, and, (5) real costs of living.  Combinations of these models determine 
most household location decisions, as is argued in the theoretical papers (e.g., Turnbull 1992) and 
demonstrated in the empirical ones (e.g., DeSalvo 1985). 
If the "workplace" model is correct, residence locations are chosen to maximize expected household 
earnings net of commute costs.  Expected wage levels and employment probability in the chosen location 
relative to other locations, and distance to work, should be significant determinants of the choice.  This 
model has been widely used to explain residential location choice in monocentric urban areas and to 
explain migration between metropolitan areas (Lerman; DeSalvo; Greenwood and Hunt; Nakosteen and 
Zimmer).  In the "human capital" model, the optimal location choice maximizes the expected return on 
the individual's investment in human capital and job search (Schwartz; Rogerson).  If the "quality of life" 
model is correct, relative wages lose explanatory power since individuals accept lower incomes in order 
to obtain higher amenities (Dickie and Gerking; Knapp and Graves; Roback).  If the "personal 
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characteristics" model is correct, demographic information such as stage in the life-cycle, marital status, 
number of school-age children, map significantly to chosen places (Clark and Hunter; Heckman,; Plane).  
If the "cost of living" model is correct, travel time and housing costs are the most significant determinants 
(Turnbull, Glascock, and Sirmans).   
In general, people choose a residence location (r) among all potential locations (r 0 R, R =    {1, ... 
,R}).  Assume that households choose their residence location to maximize their expected utility over 
market goods and services and leisure, conditioned upon local amenities; given the income they earn and 
the expenses they must incur (including travel time) while living at the chosen place, and working and 
shopping in possibly different places: 
 
 U(C,l;Sr) + λ( E[ rxw (H-l-t
w-TC)] - PC) (1) 
 
where: 
U(@) represents utility from the package of goods, leisure and amenities at r,  
C = (c1,c2, ..., cz) is a vector of market goods and services including housing, distinguished by location 
l denotes leisure time 
Sr is a vector of residence area characteristics measured in units of increasing preference.  
λ is the Lagrange multiplier (the value of relaxing the full income constraint) 
E[@] is the expected income that can be earned in the residence location.  This depends on the 
unemployment rate in the location of employment (ur) and job market characteristics around 
residential location r (Jr)  
wrx denotes returns to labor in the market for the household's skills, determined by the household's 
characteristics (X) 
H!l is total time, net of: 
tw, travel time to work 
l, leisure time 
TC (a vector product) is travel time to obtain consumer goods in the various market locations 
from residence location 
P = (p1,p2, ..., pz) prices of goods and services distinguished by place of purchases. 
 
The optimal choices of housing and goods and leisure (C*,l*) are functions of the exogenous 
variables: local amenities (Sr), distances to work and shop, unemployment rates and job market 
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characteristics (ur, Jr), prices at various locations (including rents), (P), and the household's character-
istics, X.  The value function (indirect utility function), is thus a function of these variables: 
 
 V = U(C*,l*) = v(X,Sr,ur,Jr,P,tw,T). (2) 
 
The observed location is the one that provides the largest V, chosen with some error.  This is the basis of 
the random utility model we use for this analysis. 
We estimate a model that determines the probability that location r is chosen as a function of 
characteristics of the chooser (X) and the characteristics of the choice L = (S,u,J,P).   We do not treat 
travel distances explicitly (because the data, as we show, do not allow it) but implicitly by using a 
location typology based on proximities to metropolitan areas. 
 
 The Econometric Model 
While theoretical models of residential location decisions have been developed extensively, 
econometric studies are fewer for several reasons.  First, micro data on persons and/or households, 
including personal attributes, residential locations, work locations, and/or commute times, are not 
publicly available.  In particular, the exact residential locations of individuals are suppressed to maintain 
confidentiality.  This makes it prohibitively difficult to associate local, personal, and workplace 
characteristics with an explicit consideration of travel time.  Finally, the multinomial discrete choice 
model that is appropriate for the problem requires nonlinear optimization methods that, until recently, 
were cumbersome. 
Developing the data and estimating the diverse choice model, however, is worth the effort.  The 
multinomial discrete choice approach provides more than descriptive analyses or discriminant analyses.  
With the former, we could simply describe the characteristics of people living in rural or urban locations. 
 With the latter, we could estimate a discriminant function to indicate which factors were significant in 
classifying people into groups such as those who choose rural residences and those who don't.  A 
multinomial discrete choice model estimates not only the significant factors classifying people into 
groups, but it also estimates the probability of being in a group, as well as the contribution of each 
explanatory factor to that probability.  Furthermore, we can compute the rate at which increases in the 
explanatory variables affect the probability of choice (the "marginal effects"), which summarize the 
effects of personal and local characteristics on the probability of a particular residential location being 
chosen. (Maddala 1983; Greene 1990). 
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To do this, we estimate the following model.  At any point in time, an individual faces R choices  of r 
places to live that can be classified into J categories .  The indirect utility of the ith individual living in the 
rth place of residence corresponding to jth  (Virj) is represented by the random indirect utility model: 
 
 Virj = β'Zirj + εirj;  i = 1,2, ..., N; r = 1,2, ..., R;   j =1,..., J; (3) 
 
where 
Zirj : individual and local attributes, 
β : vector of parameters, and 
εirj : random disturbance. 
 
The alternative locations are aggregated into j = 1, ..., J categories distinguished using rural/urban 
continuum codes (Butler, 1990).  This categorization reduces the number of alternatives from 3,141 (the 
number of counties in the United States in this studies) to at most four. 
The ith individual chooses to live in place of type (j) that has local characteristics (r) if the expected 
Virj is the highest.  Thus, (j) is chosen to: 
 
 Max E[Vir1,Vir2, ..., VirJ] (4) 
 
The probability that place type j is chosen depends on the probability that it provides the highest indirect 
utility: 
 
 Prob [Virj > Virk]  œk…j (5) 
 
Let Yi denote a random variable indicating the choice made by individual i.  In other words, Yi is the 
outcome of the optimization problem, Equation (2).  According to McFadden (1973), if the εirj's are 
identically distributed Weibull among J alternatives, the probability that the choice j is made is: 
 
                                                                          J 
 Prob [Yi = j] = e
β'Z  /  Σ   eβ'Z , (6) 
                                                                         j=1 
 
where, as discussed above, Zirj is a vector of attributes specific to the choosers and to the location chosen. 
 In effect, the attributes of the chosen residential location reflect the preferences of the chooser.  Thus, we 
express Zirj = [Xi, Lirj], where Xi  is the vector of the characteristics of individual i, which remain the same 
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regardless of their choice of residence location1.  Lirj is the vector of attributes of the chosen location of 
type j, with local characteristics that matter in the individual=s preferences.  Because every individual does 
not face the same local characteristics r among J alternatives, we do not estimate a multinomial 
conditional logit, which relies on assumptions that observed local attributes are invariant to the chooser. 
The estimated equations provide the set of probabilities for J location choices.  To avoid 
indeterminacy, β1 is normalized to zero.  This normalization, however, renders the estimated βj parameters 
un-interpretable.  The interpretations are based on the computed "marginal effects" (δj) relative to sample 
averages, as explained by Greene (1991).  The marginal effects in the model are partial derivatives of the 
probability with respect to the arguments: 
 
 δj / MProb[Y=j] / MZ;   j = 1,2, ..., J 
                                          / MPj / MZ 
                                                         J 
                                          = Pj [βj- Σ  Prβr] (7) 
                                                       J=1 
 
                     
     1To follow the standard notation in Multinomial Logit Model,  Zirj can be written as Zi*j, where i* = ir.  
In this case, subscript i* represents personal characteristics of ith individual and local characteristics of a 
chosen location r that matter to ith individual=s preference.  
While the parameter vector β1 is normalized to zero, the vector of marginal effects δj is constrained to 
sum to zero.  This normalization means that δ1 is calculated residually as the difference between the sum 
over δj…1 and zero.  Thus, the δj are interpretable as the net push/pull effects of an increase in the value of 
determinants Z on the decision to live in area j.  With J choices of places to live, there are J marginal 
effects for every element of Z in the model.  For example, while a good school system may in general 
increase the probability that a place will be chosen as a residence, it may be a relatively stronger 
determinant or more important to those who choose to live in a suburban area than for those who have 
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chosen to live in a metro area.  In this case the δj for j = suburb on Lirj for the chosen place characteristic 
education would be positive while the one for metro would be negative.   
As in most economic analyses, we are concerned mainly with the level of significance of a variable 
and the sign of the derivative of the dependent variable with respect to the driving one.  The level of 
significance is estimated by the t-values for each βj, and these show which explanatory variables are 
important in the choice model.  The derivative is given by the estimated marginal effects.  And it is 
relevant to note that the signs of the estimated βj and δj are not necessarily the same (except in the case 
where J = 2, or, binomial logit).  The sign on the estimated δj's indicate the direction of the marginal 
effects of a change in explanatory variables on the probability of the place being chosen.  These may be 
positive or negative, since they represent the net relative push/pull effects and must sum to zero. 
The estimation procedure is standard maximum likelihood using LIMDEP version 6.0 (Greene).  The 
likelihood function for the multinomial logit model is: 
 
                                                                               N      J 
 Ln L = Σ    Σ  dij ln Pij (8) 
                                                                               i=1   J=1 
 
where:  
dij = 1 if Yi = j, and 0 otherwise; 
Pij = Prob[Y = j]. 
 
 Regional Typology, Data, and Normalization  
We base the empirical work on individuals as the units of observation.  We used a cross-section of 
data on individuals from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for 1987.  Until 1988, the PSID 
data reported the place of residence of every individual in the sample up to a county level.  The sampled 
population is male heads of households, aged 16 to 65, who lived in the United States in 1987.  
Individuals who were in school or lived in an institution such as armed forces, prison, and health care 
facilities were excluded from the sample.  The final sample consists of 4,495 individuals. 
The residential choice model assumes that each individual chooses among R distinct places or types 
of residence locations.  Rather than consider as many alternative locations as there were individuals in the 
sample, we classified each county of residence into one of a few categories.  Since there is more diversity 
among counties typically classified as "rural" than there is between "rural" and other types of counties, we 
experimented with different groupings. 
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The USDA's Beale Code is the primary county classification system we used.2  It distinguishes ten 
types of counties by proximity to metropolitan areas and size (population density).  It distinguishes four 
types of "rural" counties: adjacent and nonadjacent, with central places of populations of 20,000 or less, 
and without any central places.  Based loosely on the Beale code, we investigated the characteristics of 
three different typologies.  In all cases, we lump all counties containing metropolitan central places into a 
single "metro" category.  The typologies we use differ in the distinctions among nonmetro counties. 
The simplest is a metropolitan/nonmetropolitan dichotomy.  The second distinguishes adjacent from 
nonadjacent nonmetro counties, for a three-way typology, also used by the Rural Policy Research 
Institute (RUPRI).  The most complex distinguishes three types of nonmetro counties according to the 
proportion of the total county population that is "rural."  "Rural" residents are those who live in 
communities with populations less than under 2,500 or, on farms.  When the percentage of population that 
rural is used to distinguish counties, we obtain a progression from the more populous nonmetro counties 
where rural residences are in the minority, to counties where the rural residences are all there is.  Table 1 
presents the three typologies we used for this analysis.  
                     
     2The rural-urban continuum code was named after Calvin Beale, a USDA demographer who developed 
the classification system.  An outline of the Beale Code used to aggregate our PSID Data is given in 
Appendix A of this paper.  See Butler (1990) for a more detailed description of the original method. 
  
The county data are drawn from the CD-ROM Counties USA-1994 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 
1995).  This data set contains information on all counties in the United States from the 1980s to the early 
1990s.  We merged the data on counties with the data on personal characteristics using the county where 
the individual lived in 1987.  We also added some data on climatic characteristics at the state level, from 
the Statistical Abstract of the U.S.A (U.S. Department of Commerce 1989).   
The local/county characteristics to be included in the residential choice model consist of amenities, 
government policies, employment, and local climatic conditions.  Climate variables are included to 
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represent amenities over which local authorities have no control, but which have already been shown to 
have significant explanatory power in residential location choice.  The government policy variables are 
mostly expenditures, although taxes are also considered.  Total and sectoral government expenditures, 
direct federal expenditures, and revenues transferred from state governments are also included in the 
model (see Table 2). 
There are several difficulties in dealing with local characteristics (Lirj) in the multinomial logit model. 
 First of all, the attributes of the place are chosen attributes, and are thus subject to nonrandom selection 
bias.  Second, some local attributes are by definition directly related to the dependent variable since they 
classify areas as rural or urban.  These problems suggest a potential for simultaneity, endogeneity, and 
misspecification if raw local characteristics of the actual observed choice are included in the multinomial 
logit model. 
An alternative approach, multinomial conditional logit, would explicitly include local characteristics 
as specific to the locations by type.  One problem with this specification is that there is significant 
heterogeneity in the local characteristics within types of locations.  For a conditional logit model, place 
characteristics should not vary from observation to observation for places of the same type.  We could use 
the averages of each characteristic for each type, but this would mask the potential role that the actual 
variation in characteristics within types plays. 
Furthermore, while we are looking for the relative significance that each local characteristic plays in 
residential location choice, it is not the characteristic of the location, but the preference of the chooser for 
the characteristic, that we are trying to discern.  By categorizing chosen residential locations into two to 
four types, we implicitly allow for unobservable fixed effects specific to the locations by type that 
distinguish choice behavior.  This is another reason why we do not use a conditional logit approach. 
A second problem is how to incorporate the range of alternative, not chosen, local characteristics into 
the model without posing an unlimited alternative set.  The typical approach is to normalize the observed 
characteristics relative to averages.  In this way, the chosen place's characteristics are measured in a way 
that shows how the place compares with other places that could have been chosen.  The problem we saw 
with this approach is that the preponderance of observations are of metro residences.  To compare local to 
the average of characteristics of residential choices would thus be a comparison of local to metro 
characteristics.  With that normalization each location choice would effectively be modelled as the result 
of a simple comparison between the chosen location and a metro location.  It would not reflect that the 
choice is made according to a comparison of the chosen characteristic level relative to levels in other 
nonmetro as well as metro locations. 
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The third problem is to control for the fact that some local characteristics are defining characteristics 
for areas by type.  For example, given the higher population density of cities, the raw data will suggest 
that persons who choose metro residences also prefer densely populated locations.   
Our strategy to deal with these three problems is this.  We (i) measure characteristics in the direction 
of increasing utility, (ii) normalize local relative to maximum levels of each characteristic, and (iii) 
identify the extent to which the observed, normalized measure deviates from the expected, by type.  These 
residuals are used as the explanatory location variables in the multinomial logit model we estimate.   
Our normalization rule is suggested by the theoretical model developed in the second section of this 
paper.  By proper choice of units, indirect utility is increasing in each attribute (Roback): 
 
 MVirj/MLirj $ 0 (9) 
 
This expression makes explicit our fundamental null hypothesis that the local attribute may have not 
relevance in the choice at all.  By choice of units, the alternative hypothesis is that the larger the 
preference for the characteristic, the higher the utility, the more likely the place is chosen.   
The steps in our normalization procedure are detailed as follows.  Local characteristics of each county 
are each expressed relative to the maximum value among all the counties in the United States.  This 
converts the measure of each local characteristic to a number ranging from zero to one. Letting L*ir denote 
the normalized local attribute:  
 
 Lr
* = Lr/Max(Lr) (10) 
 where  
r ε All 3,141 counties in the United States. 
Then, we regress normalized local attributes on metro/nonmetro, rural/urban, and state specific 
characteristics to control for potential typology bias.  The regression model for local characteristics is: 
 
                                                   50 
 Lr
* = α1 METROr + α2 RURALr + α3 PLANDs +  Σ  δs STATEs + εr (11) 
                                                                                                             s=1 
 
where 




RURALr : percentage of rural population in county r; 
PLANDr : average price of land in state s in 1987; 
STATEs : state dummy variable for state s; 
α, δ : parameters to be estimated; and 
εr  : random disturbance. 
The objective of this step is to obtain the residuals, which are thus cleaned of any simultaneity bias 
due to ruralurban, metro/nonmetro, or other state-specific patterns.  This predicted residual is the variable 
that actually enters the equation for residential choice. 
Notice that this is the only role for land rents in our model.  We maintain the hypothesis that 
nonmetro land rents reflect the opportunity cost of land in extensive uses rather than the capitalization of 
population-attracting amenities (Henderson 1982).   
We use the predicted residual ∆Lr = Lr
* - PLr
*, where PLr
* is the predicted relative local characteristic 
level estimated using Equation (11).  By construction, the predicted residual is not correlated with the 
rural/urban and metro/nonmetro typology.  We interpret this version of the local characteristic to 
represent the #unanticipated& part of the local characteristic.  A positive (negative) ∆Lr means that the 
actual Lr
* is higher (lower) than the expected Lr
* for that location type.    
 
 Personal Characteristics 
The probability of a place being chosen is modeled as depending on personal as well as local area 
characteristics (see Table 3).  Among personal characteristics, life cycle and family characteristics usually 
have good explanatory power.  For example, younger people are expected to prefer cities while older 
people might favor a rural environment.  Human capital is also expected to be strongly related to the 
choice of location.  Educated people are expected to choose residences in or near places with 
proportionately more jobs requiring higher education.  In general, high-skill jobs are more prevalent in 
cities.  Urban areas are also often preferred by educated people because there is greater employment 
variety. 
People who are married probably display higher tendencies to live in nonmetro areas for several 
reasons.  First, married people often have families, and the lower land rents in non-metro areas mean 
more affordable housing for their bigger families.  Second, amenities such as lower crime rates and lower 
population densities describe preferred environments in which to raise children.  Thus, the choice to live 
in non-metro areas is expected to be positively related to the individual characteristics of being married 
and having children. 
  
12 
Some people are apparently more geographically mobile than others.  And mobile people tend to 
choose cities.  There are several indicators of mobility.  One is experience of living in more than one state 
prior to 1987, and the second is presence of a physical disability.  A third is habit, instrumented by the 
father's education level.  Since those with higher educations are more likely to choose cities, a father's 
educational attainment is expected to have a positive effect on the probability of chosing a metro 
residence as well. 
Personal occupational characteristics are also expected to be significant in determining the chosen 
residence location.  It will not surprise anyone to find that being a farmer increases the probability of 
choosing a rural residence.  Being retired is also expected to increase the probability of choosing a 
nonmetro area, especially since amenities are unlikely to be capitalized into nonmetro rents (Knapp and 
Graves).  On the other hand, being a professional, sales, or service worker is expected to have a positive 
effect on choosing a metro residence.  Finally, we expect unemployed people to prefer metro residences 
due to the wider job opportunities near there.  
 
 Estimation and Results 
  The full residential location multinomial logit model we estimate explains the probability of the 




(β'Z) = β0 + β1AGEi + β2EDUi + β3MARRIEDi + β4NCHILDi + β5STLIVEDi + 
                   β6DISABLi + β7FEDUi + β8PUNEMPi + β9RETIREDi + β10PROFi + 
                   β11SELFEMPi + β12FARMERi + β13SALESi + β14SERVICEi + β15DENSITYir + 
                   β16CRIMEir + β17EMPGRir + β18UNEMPir + β19GEXPir + β20GEDUir + 
                   β21GHLTHir + β22GHWAYir + β23GFIREir + β24GWELFir + β25FEDir + 
                   β26STATEir + β27DEBTir + β28TAXir + β29PHYSir + β30SUNir + β31JANir + 
                   β32JULYir (12) 
 
We approached the estimation problem in two steps.  First we investigated the explanatory power of 
personal characteristics.  Then we estimated the fully-specified model.  This allowed us to observe the 
additional explanatory power of local characteristics.  We discuss the fairly descriptive information 
relating personal characteristics to residential location first.    
The estimated equations representing residential choice decisions as a function of personal 
characteristics alone are presented in Table 4.  By construction, the parameters in the equation for a metro 
choice are normalized to zero, so they do not appear in the table.  In general, these are high quality 
parameter estimates.  The null hypothesis that all parameters equal zero is rejected at 1 percent level.  The 
chi-square statistics are well above 300. 
We estimated the three models corresponding to the three versions of the rural typology explained in 
the previous section.  Notice that although all three models generally provide correct predictions 
75 percent of the time, Model 1, the binomial choice model, has a highly significant intercept (or fixed 
effect), while Model 2 doesn't, and the intercept is significant in Model 3 only for suburban nonmetro 
county residence locations.   
Otherwise, the differences between the models are most apparent in the coefficients about individual 
characteristics related to labor-force participation.  In particular, the  adjacent/nonadjacent distinction 
(Model 2) improves the significance of MARRIED in explaining location choice.  The finding is that 
being married is significantly negatively correlated with choosing a nonadjacent nonmetro location.  This 
contrasts with the simple hypothesis that married couples with families choose non-metro residences to 
reduce housing costs since the adjacent areas chosen are typically higher rent areas.  It is consistent, 
however, with a hypothesis that married couples prefer adjacent nonmetro locations since both may not be 
employed in the same area and one may need to commute 
to work.  The point is that a range of employment opportunities are important for married households in 
their residential location choice.  And, these should be within the commute range, not necessarily inside 
the county of residence. 
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Second, the estimates confirm our prior hypothesis that unemployed individuals are more likely to 
remain in adjacent nonmetro areas, since there's more opportunity to find work in the adjacent metro 
community.  An unemployed person in nonadjacent, nonmetro area may not "hang out" there.  Both of 
these aspects are significant when Models 1 or 2 are used, but they are not significant using the typologies 
in Model 3. 
All three models provide significant evidence confirming our expectations that the higher the 
education of the head of household or of his/her father (EDU,FEDU), the less likely a nonmetro residence 
is chosen.  And, no surprise, if someone is a farmer, then it is likely that the residence is nonmetro. 
Model 3, which distinguishes nonmetro counties on the basis of population densities, is the 
appropriate frame for recognizing a significant correlation between being retired and the probability of 
choosing a nonmetro residence.  Adjacency doesn't matter in this choice, evidenced by insignificance of 
this element in Models 1 and 2. 
Table 5 presents the marginal effects of personal characteristics on the probability that a nonmetro 
location is a chosen residential location.  In every significant case, the signs of the marginal effects are the 
same as on the estimated coefficients.  The estimated marginal effects thus provide additional evidence 
supporting most of the hypotheses.  For example, consider the effect of personal unemployment on the 
choice between adjacent and nonadjacent nonmetro residences.  The beta is significant and positive for 
the nonmetro adjacent location.  And the marginal effect is positive at .083, indicating that being 
unemployed significantly increases the probability of having an adjacent nonmetro residential location by 
8.3 percent, while it decreases the probability of a nonadjacent residence by 0.2 percent (insignificant). 
Since Model 3 performs better in showing the effect of AGE on the probability of choosing the 
nonmetro residence, we look more carefully at the marginal effects of AGE in Model 3.  The net effects 
of AGE is a pull towards more urbanized nonmetro areas, and away from the very rural areas.  The signs 
on the estimated marginal effects are the same as those on the betas.  It is surprising that our findings are 
significant since the sample is from economically active individuals who are between 16 and 65 years of 
age.  Having truncated the distribution of age in the sample suggests that the ability to estimate its effect 




The fitted equations for the complete residential choice model, which include both personal and local 
characteristics, are presented in Table 6.  The coefficients for metro group in each model are not presented 
because they are constrained to be zero.  The fitted equations show good quality parameter estimates 
reflected by large t-values.  The null hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero is rejected at the 1 percent 
level 
By comparing the full model with the model fit to personal characteristics alone (Table 6 and Table 
4), we find that personal characteristics alone provide correct predictions for 75 percent of the sample.  
Local characteristics alone provide correct predictions for 77 percent of the sample.  The addition of local 
characteristics to the model did not alter the signs nor the significance of the coefficients on personal 
characteristics.  In fact, the addition of local characteristics increased the significance of personal 
characteristics in residential location choice.   
The coefficients on local characteristics are also strongly significant.  This is important evidence that 
local characteristics do matter in residential location choices, not just a person's job.  
The marginal effects of the explanatory variables on residential choice associated with the results in 
Table 6 are presented in Table 7.  Notice that the signs of the marginal effects are consistent with those on 
the coefficients.  We focus on significant ones. 
Population density is a significant determinant of residential location.  The higher the unanticipated 
population density is relative to the maximum population density across all sampled counties, the less 
likely a nonmetro location is chosen.  We interpret this to suggest that those who choose to live in 
nonmetro areas actually do prefer low population densities.  In contrast, the effect of crime rates on 
residential choice is not significant. 
Labor market characteristics also play important roles in rural/urban residential choice.  The 
coefficients on EMPGR and UNEMP are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.  A higher 
than expected relative unemployment rate works against attracting people to a nonmetro residential 
location.  High relative employment growth rates appear to pull most effectively only to metro areas.  
This may suggest that attempts to attract population by using economic development strategies to raise 
expectations of employment growth are less effective in nonmetro areas than metro ones.  It may also 
suggest that in nonmetro areas an unexpectedly high relative rate of employment growth is observed 
precisely where people have not been choosing to live in the past, but may choose to live in the future.  
This hypothesis must be further investigated using data on migration with known origin and destination 
information about the sampled individuals. 
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We also find significant evidence that government expenditures at the local level play an important 
role in the probability that the place will be chosen as a residence.   Consider total government 
expenditure (GEXP).  It is interesting that the signs of the coefficients vary across our regional 
typologies.  According to the binomial Model 1, higher-than-expected relative total government 
expenditure makes nonmetro areas more attractive places to live.  The marginal effect is about 0.3 
percent, and positive.  This means government expenditures as attractive factors are worth more to 
nonmetro areas than to metro ones.  According to Model 2, we find that the effects, however, do depend 
on proximity to metro areas.  There is a net pull toward adjacent areas, away from nonadjacent, nonmetro 
areas.  Finally, Model 3 shows that total government expenditures provide the strongest net pull effects 
for 50 to 75 percent rural, nonmetro areas, regardless of whether or not the area is adjacent. 
In particular, government expenditure on education (GEDU) is significant in all models.  The net 
pull, however, is toward metro areas.  In other words, metro areas that display higher than predicted 
relative spending on education pull residents from other types of locations.  Thus the marginal effects of 
education spending in nonmetro locations are consistently negative.  This result echoes by Fox, Herzog, 
and Schlottman (1989), who found that higher government expenditures on education significantly 
reduced the probability of moving out of a metro location. 
The effects of distance are highlighted by comparing effects across typologies.  Consider the 
estimated effects of government expenditure on health and hospitals (GHLTH) on residential location.  
First notice that it is not significant when nonmetro areas are all lumped together, as in Model 1.  This is 
explained by the highly significant, but offsetting, effects in adjacent relative to nonadjacent nonmetro 
areas.  Higher-than-expected relative government per capita expenditures on health make the 
nonmetro/nonadjacent areas more attractive, while adjacent nonmetro areas are less attractive.  An 
explanation is that since adjacency means metro health care services are more accessible, people who live 
in adjacent nonmetro areas care less about the local government expenditure on health.  This 
interpretation is further supported by the estimated marginal effects in Model 3.  The positive effect of 
government expenditure on health service is significant only for the very rural locations.  The implication 
is that government expenditure on health service is important in making nonadjacent and very rural areas 
attractive places to live.  
Likewise, government expenditure on highways provides a significant net pull to the most rural areas, 
away from the adjacent and less rural nonmetro areas, as well as away from metro areas.  The marginal 
effect of this expenditure on the probability of living in rural areas (Model 3) is one of the largest and it is 
positive.  Again, the implication is that highway expenditure is an important factor in making the 
nonadjacent and very rural locations attractive for residents. 
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Government expenditure on welfare programs is significantly negatively related to the attractiveness 
of a nonmetro residential location.  The net-pull effect of higher-than-predicted relative welfare payments 
is toward the metro area and away from the nonmetro ones.  All models concur.  By the same token, 
direct federal government expenditures (FED), which are mostly social security transfer payments (to 
elderly) and farm program payments, are negatively related to the probability that people choose the 
location.  The implications are that localities that are unusually attractive to welfare and social security 
payment recipients are not attractive to the economically active segment of the population.  No surprise!  
And imagine what this means when spending on welfare programs comes under local control.  
Communities interested in attracting the economically active segments would not favor generous welfare 
spending. 
An important and significant contributor to the probability that a nonmetro residential location is 
chosen is the level of general government revenues from the state (STATE).  This characteristic is 
significant in all models and signs of all marginal effects are consistently positive.  In many cases, the 
majority of state funds are used to improve infrastructure and other services.  In other cases, it is for 
education, when local taxes are insufficient.  Most of these types of state funds will be anticipated and 
thus are controlled for by our local characteristics normalization procedure.  Thus, it is very interesting 
that our multinomial logit model estimates suggest that unanticipated, relatively high   state-to-local 
revenues are positively correlated with residential location choice.  Higher than expected state revenue 
transfers are particularly effective at making the most rural nonmetro areas attractive places to live. 
The effects of total outstanding debt are significant only when adjacency or non-adjacency is the 
fixed effect (Model 2).  We found that higher than predicted debt is positively related to the choice of 
adjacent nonmetro locations while it is significantly negatively related to the choice of nonadjacent ones.  
The fact is that both growing and declining localities may be in debt, with opposite implications about 
attractiveness as residences.  Nonadjacent areas in debt are more likely the declining ones, and thus the 
negative marginal is a reasonable reflection of that unobserved fixed effect distinguishing adjacent from 
nonadjacent nonmetro areas.  The lack of significance in Model 3 on DEBT further supports this 
interpretation. 
Higher than predicted tax rates would hardly be considered attractive, and most of the estimated 
marginal effects reflect that.  Nevertheless, the marginal effect of TAX on the probability that a mildly 
rural location is chosen is significantly positive.  This means that unexpectedly higher relative tax rates 
provide a net pull to the least rural of nonmetro locations; in other words, to the suburbs.  This important 
finding suggests that there are nonmetro residents willing to pay the taxes needed to support a high 
quality suburban lifestyle. 
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By the same logic, we interpret the significantly positive effect of statewide sunny days (SUN) as 
meaning that if someone can afford to be a resident of a nonadjacent, nonmetro area, sunny days matter.   
This finding is also likely associated with the population growth of the Sun Belt in the late 1980s.  The 
rural areas of the southwest and the mountain states (Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Montana, 
and Wyoming) are also characterized by higher than predicted numbers of sunny days relative to the 
sunniest places.  Furthermore, nonmetro residential locations appear significantly more desirable than 
metro ones is the weather is hot.  Better to swelter in the countryside or by a suburban swimming pool 
than in a city. 
Finally, we also have evidence of the Aicefishing@ effect.  The estimated marginal effects of January 
temperatures are significantly negative.  Thus, the relatively warmer January is, the less likely a nonmetro 
residential location is chosen.  Note, however, that these weather effects enter the model without 
controlling for predictable January temperatures by type of location.  Thus, in general, nonmetro residents 
appear to prefer to experience temperature extremes from a nonmetro residential base.  This can mean that 
people who choose nonmetro residences really do prefer extensive outdoor activities like skiing, 
snowmobile riding, and icefishing that people just don't get to do frequently if they live in a metro area. 
 
 Summary and Conclusions 
In order to identify which rural development strategy is more appropriate for a place, we have taken a 
rural/urban perspective on the second part of the old conundrum: 'do people follow jobs or do jobs follow 
people?'  We have estimated a multinomial logit model explaining the probabilities that people choose a 
residential location according to their own and the location's characteristics. 
This is the first empirical discrete choice study of rural/urban residential location choice of which we 
are aware.  Empirical investigation is critical since, as Turnbull (1992) has shown, in the model of 
household behavior with the time allocation problem explicit and where both wages and rents may vary 
across space, there are few unambiguous theoretical implications relating residential location to income or 
to the distance from employment location.  
Our discrete choice approach, pioneered by McFadden, is not the typical approach applied to issues 
of regional population growth.  One precedent is the work by Fox, Herzog, and Schlottman (1989).  They 
estimated the probability that a person has moved between county groups and show how personal and 
local characteristics explain whether the movement was into or out of a metropolitan area.  Our findings 
concerning nonmetro areas, especially about the roles of fiscal variables, are consistent with theirs.  Most 
other studies use least-squares models to explain changes in net in-migration or the change in population 
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density.  Our findings are also consistent with those interpreted as supporting the "jobs follow people" 
hypotheses.  We find (as did Carlino and Mills) that amenities (such as roads) do matter.  
We can predict with 77 percent accuracy the residential location choice based on local characteristics 
(amenities) alone.  In particular, we find that the low population density of a nonmetro residential location 
contributes significantly and positively to the probability that a nonmetro residence location is chosen.  
Thus, low population density is an attractive amenity for nonmetro residents.  (Carlino and Mills found 
that nonadjacent locations attracted employment while repelling population.)  In contrast, crime rates 
have no significant explanatory power in our model of rural/urban residential location choice.   
Very interesting is the lack of evidence that people follow general job growth to nonmetro areas.  Our 
estimates show the higher the employment growth rate, the stronger is the net pull towards metro away 
from nonmetro residential locations.  The coefficient is consistently significantly negative across all 
model specifications.  We are not surprised to find major differences between what explains 
intermetropolitan versus urban/rural patterns.  For example, Greenwood and Hunt found that for 
metropolitan migration, employment opportunities are far more important than location-specific 
amenities.   
Furthermore, unexpectedly high unemployment rates don't reduce the probability that a nonmetro 
residence location is chosen.  On the contrary, it is significantly and positively affecting the probability 
that a nonmetro residence is chosen.  
We also find significant evidence that people are attracted to rural residences by other things 
governments can do.  The higher government spending is in a nonmetro area, the higher the probability it 
is chosen.  This is particularly significant for adjacent nonmetro areas, but it is insignificant for most rural 
areas.  The government instrument that has significant net positive pull effects into nonadjacent, nonmetro 
locations is the level of state government transfer to the local government (typically related to roads, 
utilities, and schools).  In general, state subsidies for local infrastructure are positively correlated with 
increased probability that the nonmetro location is chosen.  Government spending on highways also 
contributes significantly and positively to the probability that the most rural areas, and nonadjacent areas 
in general, are chosen for residence. 
Government expenditures on health care are insignificant in the choice of an adjacent nonmetro 
location, but they are significant and positive in determining the choice to live in nonadjacent or in the 
most rural locations.  Also, the higher the local dependence on welfare and social security transfers, the 
lower the probability that the place is chosen as a residence.  The implications are that localities that are 
unusually attractive to welfare and social security payment recipients are not attractive to the 
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economically active segment of the population.  (Get ready for the "race to the bottom" on welfare 
spending.) 
Finally, it appears that relatively high taxes do not necessarily reduce the probability that a nonmetro 
residence is chosen.  The empirical work provides evidence that suburban-type residential locations are 
attractive even with relatively higher taxes per person than expected among counties of the same type. 
We can also predict with 75 percent accuracy the residential location of a person according to their 
personal characteristics alone.  As expected: educated, mobile, professionals with fewer kids are more 
likely to reside in a metro area than a nonmetro one.  If the person is a farmer, retired, has lots of kids, or 
is unemployed, they are more likely to have a nonmetro residence.  If the male head-of-household is 
married, the more likely the household has a metro or at least an adjacent nonmetro residence.  This 
suggests that opportunities for both spouses to work within a commute range is a significant constraint on 
where people choose to live.  There are also significantly fewer self-employed people with adjacent 
nonmetro residences than with metro or nonadjacent, nonmetro ones.  
In further research we would like to analyze the residential location choice by considering complete 
information about employment location and commuting choice.  At present, these data are not available to 
the public except in the form that identifies locations as PUMA (Public Use Microsample Areas), which 
are aggregates of metro and nonmetro counties for confidentiality purposes.  Less aggregated data would 
also be useful to focus more closely on the effects of local characteristics on residence location by 
particular types of persons, such as the "entrepreneurial" class.  And we would like to do a better job of 
looking at retirees and the implications of family ties. 
Furthermore, we are surprised that local characteristics at the county level of regional aggregation 
were significant at all, given the variations in fiscal patterns across communities within counties.  We 
would like to estimate the model with local data at a much finer geographic level.  We are also concerned 
about the possibility of Type I error given that the arguments in our estimated models are estimated as 
well.   
Finally, some aspects of the broader hypothesis we are investigatingCabout the relative efficacy of 
smokestack chasing as opposed to investing in providing a better quality of lifeCshould be investigated in 
an explicitly dynamic migration choice model. 
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Table 1.  Rural/urban typologies and distribution in the sample 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Classification           Frequency (Percent) 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Model 1: Metro/Non-Metro Dichotomy (J = 2) 
 
Define Y1 = 1 if a county is metro         3,395   (74.7) 
        (Beale code = 1, 2, 3, 4) 
 
          = 2 otherwise.         1,136   (25.3) 
 
Model 2: RUPRI classification (J = 3) 
 
Define Y2 = 1 if a county is metro         3,395   (74.7) 
        (Beale code = 1, 2, 3, 4) 
 
          = 2 if a county is non-metro, adjacent       482   (10.7) 
        (Beale Code = 5, 7, 9) 
 
          = 3 if a county is non-metro, non-adjacent             654   (14.5) 
        (Beale Code = 6, 8, 10) 
 
Model 3: Classification based on percentage of rural population (J = 4) 
 
Define Y4 = 1 if a county is metro         3,395   (74.7) 
        (Beale code = 1, 2, 3, 4) 
 
          = 2 if a county is non-metro (Beale Code > 4)      296   ( 6.6) 
        and rural population is less than 50 percenta 
 
          = 3 if a county is non-metro (Beale Code > 4)      510   (11.3) 
        and rural population is equal or greater than 
        50 percent, but less than 75 percent. 
 
          = 4 if a county is non-metro (Beale Code > 4)      330   ( 7.3) 
        and rural population is equal or greater than 
        75 percent. 
Total             4,495  (100.0) 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
a
 The portion of the sample who live in non-metro areas with rural populations 
of less than 25 percent is very small (21, or 0.5 percent of total sample). 
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Table 2. County local characteristics, descriptions, sample means, and 
maximum values  
Variable Description     Sample Mean  Max. Value 
 
DENSITY Population/square mile     219   58,405 
 
CRIME  Serious crime known to police/ 2,826   19,259 
100,000 population in 1987 
 
UNEMP  Unemployment rate, 1986 (percent)     8.69      37.9 
 
EMPGR  Employment growth, 1986-87      3.08     191.42 
(percent) 
 
GEXP  General government    1,400.52  15,267.00 
expenditure/capita ($) 
 
GEDU  Government expenditure on     687.66   6,719.28 
education/capita ($) 
 
GHLTH  Government expenditure on health   124.39   2,528.23 
and hospitals/capita ($) 
 
GHWAY  Government expenditure on     122.12   3,534.93 
highways/capita ($) 
 
GFIRE  Government expenditure on      19.85     239.29 
fire protection/capita ($) 
 
GWELF  Government expenditure on     37.00     876.30 
welfare/capita ($) 
 
FED Direct federal government    253.38       29,952.53 
expenditure/capita (thousand $) 
 
STATE  General government revenue from   527.85   5,908.13 
state government/capita, 1987 ($) 
 
DEBT  Total debt outstanding; $/capital 1,381       207,906 
(1987) 
 
TAX Estimated tax rate, calculated as     5.36      31.75 
total revenue from tax per capita 
divided by per capita income, 
1987 (percent) 
 
PHYS  Active nonfederal physician/     88.60   1,938 
100,000 population, 1986 
 
SUN Number of sunny days/year, state    253      328 
average, 1987 
 
JAN January temperature, state 30-year    33       73 
average (degrees Fahrenheit) 
 
JULY  July temperature, state 30-year    77       92 
average (degrees Fahrenheit) 
Note:  (N = 3,141 counties) 
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Table 3.  Personal characteristics, descriptions, sample means, and standard 
       deviations  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variable Description       Mean  Std.   
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
AGE Age of individual in years    37.160 11.964 
 
EDU Education of individual in years   12.232  2.785 
 
MARRIED Dummy variable equals to 1 if individual   0.836  0.370 
      is married, and 0 otherwise 
 
NCHILD Number of children in the family    1.088  1.216 
 
STLIVED Number of states individual has lived before  1.365  1.938 
 
DISABL Dummy variable equals to 1 if individual   0.036  0.186 
      experience physical disability that limits 
      his mobility, and 0 otherwise 
 
FEDU  Father's education in years     9.103  3.580 
 
PUNEMP Personal unemployment, dummy variable equals  0.040       0.195 
      to 1 if individual is unemployed during the 
survey and 0 otherwise 
 
RETIRED Dummy variable equals to 1 if individual   0.066  0.249 
is retired, and 0 otherwise 
 
PROF  Dummy variable equals to 1 if individual   0.286  0.452 
is professionals, technical, or kindred  
workers, and 0 otherwise 
 
SELFEMP Dummy variable equals to 1 if individual   0.126  0.332 
is self-employed, and 0 otherwise 
 
FARMER Dummy variable equals to 1 if individual   0.027  0.163 
is a farmer or working in a farm, and 0 
otherwise 
 
SALES  Dummy variable equals to 1 if individual   0.012  0.107 
is a sales worker, and 0 otherwise 
 
SERVICE Dummy variable equals to 1 if individual   0.068  0.252 
is service workers, and 0 otherwise 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: (N = 4,495 individuals) 
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Table 4.  Multinomial logit estimates of residential choice model, personal 
       characteristics  
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
          Model 1           Model 2                     Model 3 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
         Non-              Non-metro                 Non-metro 
         metro         Adj.     Non-adj.     Rural<50 50<Rural<75 75<Rural  
         Y1=2          Y2=2       Y2=3        Y3=2       Y3=3      Y3=4 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Constant    0.703 *    -0.050     0.038       -2.004 *   0.081     0.608 
          ( 3.016 )   (-0.164 ) ( 0.129 )    (-5.093 ) ( 0.259 ) ( 1.616)  
 
AGE         0.002      -0.001     0.004        0.015 *   0.003    -0.014* 
          ( 0.631 )   (-0.154 ) ( 1.068 )    ( 3.023 ) ( 0.606 ) (-2.662) 
 
EDU        -0.098 *    -0.127 *  -0.073 *     -0.050 *  -0.113 *  -0.123* 
          (-6.859 )   (-6.984 ) (-4.034 )    (-2.107 ) (-6.076 ) (-5.523) 
 
MARRIED    -0.136       0.128    -0.350 *     -0.030    -0.222    -0.115 
          (-1.381 )   ( 0.926 ) (-2.869 )    (-0.183 ) (-1.668 ) (-0.680) 
 
NCHILD      0.123 *     0.118 *   0.128 *      0.159 *   0.093     0.131* 
          ( 3.639 )   ( 2.669 ) ( 2.946 )    ( 3.008 ) ( 1.958 ) ( 2.350) 
 
STLIVED    -0.049 *    -0.034    -0.064 *     -0.102 *  -0.036    -0.019 
          (-2.506 )   (-1.338 ) (-2.497 )    (-2.954 ) (-1.344 ) (-0.604) 
 
DISABL      0.171      -0.288     0.490        0.203    -0.168     0.706* 
          ( 0.762 )   (-0.857 ) ( 1.850 )    ( 0.573 ) (-0.504 ) ( 2.002) 
 
FEDU       -0.048 *    -0.023    -0.071 *     -0.015    -0.046 *  -0.090* 
          (-4.322 )   (-1.508 ) (-5.006 )    (-0.849 ) (-2.954 ) (-4.749) 
 
PUNEMP      0.497 *     0.756 *   0.096        0.350     0.542     0.687 
          ( 2.320 )   ( 3.002 ) ( 0.299 )    ( 1.005 ) ( 1.896 ) ( 1.859) 
 
RETIRED     0.088       0.093     0.083       -0.652 *   0.187     0.667* 
          ( 0.559 )   ( 0.447 ) ( 0.406 )    (-2.181 ) ( 0.889 ) ( 2.489) 
 
PROF       -0.373 *    -0.282 *  -0.458 *     -0.210    -0.344 *  -0.732* 
          (-3.619 )   (-2.040 ) (-3.376 )    (-1.308 ) (-2.358 ) (-3.599) 
 
SELFEMP    -0.072      -0.337 *   0.121        0.107    -0.222    -0.116 
          (-0.686 )   (-2.225 ) ( 0.950 )    ( 0.695 ) (-1.462 ) (-0.637) 
 
FARM        1.712 *     1.173 *   1.951 *      1.956 *   1.463 *   1.711* 
          ( 8.587 )   ( 4.265 ) ( 9.168 )    ( 7.909 ) ( 5.646 ) ( 6.227) 
 
SALES      -1.094 *    -2.089 *  -0.743       -1.971 *  -0.735    -0.965 
          (-2.797 )   (-2.188 ) (-1.754 )    (-2.061 ) (-1.459 ) (-1.331) 
 
SERVICE    -0.243      -0.103    -0.394       -0.073    -0.191    -0.554 
          (-1.527 )   (-0.506 ) (-1.809 )    (-0.288 ) (-0.876 ) (-1.810) 
 
Likelihood    -2,461         -3,261                        -3,724 
Accuracy (%)   74.97          74.95                         74.39 




Note: (t-values are in parentheses) 
*Denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
 Table 5.  Marginal effects of personal characteristics on the probability of  
       Y = r 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
          Unit      Model 1       Model 2                  Model 3 
                  __________________________________________________________________ 
 
                     Non-         Non-metro                Non-metro 
                     metro     Adj.  Non-adj.    Rural<50 50<Rural<75 75<Rural 
                     Y1=2      Y2=2  Y2=3           Y3=2      Y3=3      Y3=4 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
AGE      year       0.000     -0.000    0.001       0.001    0.000   -0.001  
 
EDU      year      -0.019     -0.013   -0.006      -0.002   -0.010   -0.007  
 
MARRIED  (0, 1)    -0.026      0.021   -0.044       0.000   -0.022   -0.006  
 
NCHILD   1, 2, ...  0.023      0.011    0.013       0.010    0.007    0.007  
 
STLIVED  1, 2, ... -0.009     -0.003   -0.007      -0.007   -0.003   -0.000  
 
DISABL   (0, 1)     0.033     -0.041    0.064       0.012   -0.025    0.046  
 
FEDU     year      -0.009     -0.001   -0.008      -0.000   -0.004   -0.005  
 
PUNEMP   (0, 1)     0.095      0.083   -0.002       0.017    0.047    0.039  
 
RETIRED  (0, 1)     0.017      0.009    0.008      -0.053    0.020    0.046  
 
PROF     (0, 1)    -0.071     -0.023   -0.050      -0.008   -0.027   -0.044  
 
SELFEMP  (0, 1)    -0.014     -0.040    0.021       0.011   -0.023   -0.006  
 
FARM     (0, 1)     0.326      0.097    0.213       0.120    0.119    0.089  
 
SALES    (0, 1)    -0.208     -0.221   -0.052      -0.132   -0.050   -0.046  
 
SERVICE  (0, 1)    -0.046     -0.004   -0.046      -0.000   -0.014   -0.034  
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: Marginal effects relative to a metro location are not presented, but can be 




 = 0. 
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Table 6.  Multinomial logit estimates of residential choice model, personal and 
       local characteristics  
 
          Model 1           Model 2                     Model 3 
         Non-              Non-metro                 Non-metro 
         metro         Adj.     Non-adj.     Rural<50 50<Rural<75 75<Rural  




Constant  -6.283 *     -2.096    -13.466 *   -16.769 *  -5.465 *  -6.556 * 
        ( -6.93 )    ( -1.79 ) ( -11.45 )   (-11.50 ) ( -4.11 ) ( -4.57 ) 
 
AGE        0.002       -0.000      0.006       0.017 *   0.004    -0.012 * 
        (  0.63 )    ( -0.09 ) (   1.24 )   (  2.99 ) (  0.72 ) ( -2.02 ) 
 
EDU       -0.091 *     -0.110 *   -0.076 *    -0.051    -0.110 *  -0.103 * 
        ( -5.16 )    ( -5.05 ) (  -3.56 )   ( -1.80 ) ( -4.91 ) ( -4.07 ) 
 
MARRIED   -0.397 *     -0.094     -0.620 *    -0.338    -0.476 *  -0.348 
        ( -3.25 )    ( -0.59 ) (  -4.18 )   ( -1.75 ) ( -3.04 ) ( -1.83 ) 
 
NCHILD     0.094 *      0.075      0.114 *     0.101     0.066     0.110 
        (  2.28 )    (  1.45 ) (   2.22 )   (  1.60 ) (  1.18 ) (  1.73 ) 
 
STLIVED   -0.028       -0.003     -0.054      -0.092 *  -0.007     0.002 
        ( -1.21 )    ( -0.10 ) (  -1.82 )   ( -2.46 ) ( -0.23 ) (  0.06 ) 
 
DISABL     0.675 *      0.307      0.851 *     0.703     0.288     1.071 * 
        (  2.44 )    (  0.79 ) (   2.62 )   (  1.67 ) (  0.73 ) (  2.72 ) 
 
FEDU      -0.040 *     -0.019     -0.054 *    -0.008    -0.039 *  -0.079 * 
        ( -2.90 )    ( -1.10 ) (  -3.26 )   ( -0.37 ) ( -2.16 ) ( -3.72 ) 
 
PUNEMP     0.573 *      1.044 *   -0.073       0.571     0.684 *   0.701 
        (  2.19 )    (  3.45 ) (  -0.20 )   (  1.42 ) (  2.05 ) (  1.69 ) 
 
RETIRED    0.232        0.355      0.134      -0.523     0.379     0.698 * 
        (  1.23 )    (  1.49 ) (   0.55 )   ( -1.56 ) (  1.55 ) (  2.29 ) 
 
PROF      -0.373 *     -0.304     -0.417 *    -0.282    -0.451 *  -0.663 * 
        ( -3.04 )    ( -1.92 ) (  -2.66 )   ( -1.54 ) ( -2.68 ) ( -2.93 ) 
 
SELFEMP    0.099       -0.092      0.234       0.235     0.068    -0.128 
        (  0.78 )    ( -0.53 ) (   1.56 )   (  1.30 ) (  0.40 ) ( -0.61 ) 
 
FARM       1.632 *      1.181 *    1.718 *     1.844 *   1.743 *   1.375 * 
        (  6.80 )    (  3.76 ) (   6.73 )   (  6.13 ) (  5.82 ) (  4.18 ) 
 
SALES     -1.398 *     -2.344 *   -1.054 *    -2.456 *  -0.875    -1.360 
        ( -3.18 )    ( -2.40 ) (  -2.18 )   ( -2.49 ) ( -1.63 ) ( -1.78 ) 
 
SERVICE   -0.085        0.041     -0.185       0.055    -0.017    -0.385 




DENSITY   -0.175 *     -0.154 *   -0.197      -0.262 *  -0.223 *  -0.105 * 
        ( -8.15 )    ( -5.79 ) (  -5.91 )   ( -4.31 ) ( -6.85 ) ( -3.76 ) 
 
CRIME      0.001       -0.012      0.016       0.022 *  -0.004     0.009 
        (  0.10 )    ( -1.38 ) (   1.92 )   (  2.04 ) ( -0.43 ) (  0.81 ) 
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Table 6.  (Continued) 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
          Model 1           Model 2                     Model 3 
         Non-              Non-metro                 Non-metro 
         metro         Adj.     Non-adj.     Rural<50 50<Rural<75 75<Rural  
         Y1=2          Y2=2       Y2=3       Y3=2      Y3=3      Y3=4 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
EMPGR     -0.131 *     -0.152 *   -0.116 *    -0.113 *  -0.192 *  -0.094 * 
        ( -8.34 )    ( -7.61 ) (  -6.18 )   ( -4.95 ) ( -8.91 ) ( -4.07 ) 
 
UNEMP     -0.107 *     -0.165 *   -0.071 *    -0.142 *  -0.087 *  -0.086 * 
        (-13.33 )    (-14.43 ) (  -7.69 )   (-10.96 ) ( -7.92 ) ( -7.14 ) 
 
GEXP       0.048        0.259 *   -0.167      -0.328 *   0.131     0.017 
        (  0.96 )    (  3.58 ) (  -1.94 )   ( -3.03 ) (  1.75 ) (  0.18 ) 
 
GEDU      -0.251 *     -0.327 *   -0.195 *    -0.089    -0.261 *  -0.226 * 
        ( -6.37 )    ( -6.38 ) (  -3.55 )   ( -1.20 ) ( -4.58 ) ( -3.51 ) 
 
GHLTH      0.011       -0.062 *    0.062 *     0.033    -0.013     0.052 * 
        (  1.03 )    ( -3.90 ) (   4.04 )   (  1.67 ) ( -0.80 ) (  2.94 ) 
 
GHWAY     -0.045       -0.256 *    0.037      -0.179 *  -0.326 *   0.220 * 
        ( -1.33 )    ( -4.77 ) (   0.85 )   ( -2.67 ) ( -5.46 ) (  4.73 ) 
 
GFIRE      0.029 *      0.009      0.037 *     0.012     0.047 *  -0.003 
        (  5.91 )    (  1.23 ) (   6.82 )   (  0.92 ) (  7.20 ) ( -0.27 ) 
 
GWELF     -0.094 *     -0.061 *   -0.122 *    -0.043 *  -0.077 *  -0.108 * 
        ( -7.34 )    ( -3.72 ) (  -6.95 )   ( -1.98 ) ( -3.72 ) ( -4.85 ) 
 
FED       -0.295 *     -0.288 *   -0.284 *    -0.470 *  -0.260 *  -0.218 * 
        (-15.03 )    (-10.38 ) ( -11.45 )   ( -9.82 ) ( -8.89 ) ( -8.52 ) 
 
STATE      0.242 *      0.289 *    0.256 *     0.183 *   0.124 *   0.256 * 
        (  9.28 )    (  8.27 ) (   7.72 )   (  2.94 ) (  2.52 ) (  6.69 ) 
 
DEBT      -0.013        0.158 *   -0.476 *    -0.091     0.067     0.039 
        ( -0.24 )    (  2.45 ) (  -3.79 )   ( -0.67 ) (  0.98 ) (  0.54 ) 
 
TAX       -0.614 *     -1.009 *   -0.044       0.500 *  -0.719 *  -0.914 * 
        ( -4.04 )    ( -4.79 ) (  -0.23 )   (  1.98 ) ( -3.29 ) ( -4.01 ) 
 
PHYS      -0.036 *     -0.067 *   -0.011      -0.057 *  -0.007    -0.070 * 
        ( -3.44 )    ( -4.39 ) (  -0.92 )   ( -3.20 ) ( -0.58 ) ( -3.61 ) 
 
SUN        0.448       -4.804 *    4.907 *     6.352 *  -7.732 *  -0.174 
        (  0.65 )    ( -4.90 ) (   5.64 )   (  5.74 ) ( -6.42 ) ( -0.16 ) 
 
JAN       -2.020 *     -1.174 *   -2.702 *    -4.058 *  -2.504 *  -0.705 
        ( -5.56 )    ( -2.30 ) (  -6.11 )   ( -7.36 ) ( -4.26 ) ( -1.20 ) 
 
JULY       9.265 *      7.308 *   13.238 *    14.063 *  15.095 *   8.928 * 
        (  9.36 )    (  5.17 ) (  10.93 )   (  9.08 ) (  7.54 ) (  5.70 ) 
 
Likelihood -1,773         -2,405                        -2,784 
Accuracy (%)   78.73          76.88                         76.48 
Chi-Square  1,679.3 (32)   2,078.9 (64)                  2,259.7 (96) 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  (t-values are in parentheses) 
*Denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
 Table 7.  Marginal effects on the probability of Y = r  
          Unit      Model 1       Model 2                  Model 3 
 
                                Nonmetro                 Nonmetro 
                   Nonmetro   Adj.  Nonadj.      Rural<50 50<Rural<75 75<Rural 





AGE       year      0.000     -0.000    0.000      0.000     0.000    -0.000 
EDU       year     -0.005     -0.002   -0.002     -0.000    -0.002    -0.002 
MARRIED   (0, 1)   -0.022     -0.001   -0.013     -0.001    -0.008    -0.006 
NCHILD    1, 2,..   0.005      0.001    0.002      0.000     0.001     0.002 
STLIVED   1, 2,..  -0.002     -0.000   -0.001     -0.000    -0.000     0.000 
DISABL    (0, 1)    0.037      0.005    0.018      0.002     0.005     0.019 
FEDU      year     -0.002     -0.000   -0.001     -0.000    -0.001    -0.001 
PUNEMP    (0, 1)    0.031      0.019   -0.002      0.001     0.012     0.012 
RETIRED   (0, 1)    0.013      0.006    0.003     -0.001     0.006     0.012 
PROF      (0, 1)   -0.021     -0.005   -0.009     -0.001    -0.008    -0.011 
SELFEMP   (0, 1)    0.005     -0.002    0.005      0.001     0.001    -0.002 
FARM      (0, 1)    0.090      0.021    0.037      0.004     0.030     0.023 
SALES     (0, 1)   -0.077     -0.042   -0.022     -0.006    -0.015    -0.023 




DENSITY            -0.010     -0.003   -0.004     -0.001    -0.004    -0.002 
CRIME               0.000     -0.000    0.000      0.000    -0.000     0.000 
EMPGR              -0.007     -0.003   -0.002     -0.000    -0.003    -0.002 
UNEMP              -0.006     -0.003   -0.001     -0.000    -0.001    -0.001 
GEXP                0.003      0.005   -0.004     -0.001     0.002     0.000 
GEDU               -0.014     -0.006   -0.004     -0.000    -0.004    -0.004 
GHLTH               0.001     -0.001    0.001      0.000    -0.000     0.001 
GHWAY              -0.002     -0.005    0.001     -0.000    -0.006     0.004 
GFIRE               0.002      0.000    0.001      0.000     0.001    -0.000 
GWELF              -0.005     -0.001   -0.003     -0.000    -0.001    -0.002 
FED                -0.016     -0.005   -0.006     -0.001    -0.004    -0.004 
STATE               0.013      0.005    0.005      0.000     0.002     0.004 
DEBT               -0.001      0.003   -0.010     -0.000     0.001     0.001 
TAX                -0.034     -0.018   -0.001      0.001    -0.012    -0.016 
PHYS               -0.002     -0.001   -0.000     -0.000    -0.000    -0.001 
SUNb                 0.025     -0.090    0.108      0.015    -0.135    -0.001 
JANb                -0.111     -0.020   -0.058     -0.009    -0.043    -0.011 
JULYb                0.510      0.128    0.284      0.032     0.260     0.150 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
aThe units of local characteristics in the model are deviation from 
the predicted-normalized values, multiplied by 100 (see Equation 10 and 11) 
 
bSUN, JAN and JULY are measured only as relative to their maximum values,  













Code  Description 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 1  Central counties including metropolitan areas of 1 million population or more 
 
 2  Fringe counties of metropolitan areas of 1 million population or more 
 
 3  Counties in metropolitan areas of 250 thousand to 1 million population 
 
 4  Counties with metropolitan areas with less than 250 thousand population 
 
 5  Counties with urban populations of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metropolitan area 
 
 6  Counties with urban populations of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metropolitan area 
 
 7  Counties with urban populations of less than 20,000, adjacent to a metropolitan area 
 
 8  Counties with urban populations less than 20,000, not adjacent to a metropolitan area 
 
 9  Completely rural counties, adjacent to a metropolitan area 
 
10  Completely rural counties which are not adjacent to a metropolitan area 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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